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Abstract
This paper conducts a comprehensive study of patent citations in patents granted
to Belgian corporate applicants by the United States and the European Patent
Offices using qualitative response variable analysis. The analysis uncovered
different patterns of citations in patents, which belong to different industrial
classes. The studied citation data provides evidence of inter- or intra-firm and
inter- or intra-industry knowledge spillovers, which are quite industry specific. In
the framework of R&D cooperation stimulating policies, our results advocate for
considering those differences in order to balance the effect of knowledge
spillovers driven market incentives and direct regulation.
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The presented research aims at tracking down knowledge spillovers in Belgium by 
following some of their “trails”.  There are no doubts about the importance of knowledge 
spillovers for economic growth.  In a contemporary knowledge and technology driven 
economy the role of knowledge exchange and dissemination is often as important as, for 
example, the role of direct investment.  Firstly, such spillovers allow a better penetration 
and diffusion of innovation among economic agents increasing their competitiveness 
(through lower costs of new technologies).  Secondly, they stimulate cooperation in R&D 
by creating additional incentives for innovators to try to internalize knowledge flows and 
pool the resources in joint research efforts.  Both of these types of effects eventually result 
in faster technological progress and economic growth in the country. 
 
1.1. Knowledge, Spillovers, Competition and Economic Growth: the Theory 
There is one important aspect worth mentioning, which is the difference between 
information and knowledge.  Information is free to obtain and can be freely disseminated 
(almost) without any cost.  On the other hand, knowledge is something, which can hardly 
be enumerated or codified.  Knowledge is exactly that intangible asset that can have a 
certain economic value if properly used and commercialized. 
Although a knowledge spillover is a phenomenon, which is quite easy to imagine, it is 
much more difficult to actually come up with an effective measure of it.  According to the 
definition given by De Bondt (1996), the concept of a ‘knowledge spillover’ is specified as 
an ‘involuntary leakage or voluntary exchange’ of technological knowledge.  Another 
definition, presented in Nieuwenhuijsen and van Stel (2000), describes knowledge 
spillovers as the situation, in which one economic agent benefits from R&D efforts of 
another economic agent without any tangible remuneration.   
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) classify knowledge spillovers as vertical or horizontal.  
Horizontal spillovers occur between competitors, and vertical spillovers flow between 
firms in different industries. Both these types of spillovers are directly linked to three 
factors of economic growth (Glaeser et al. (1992)): specialization, competition and diversity. 
Specialization is characterized by a higher intensity of intra-industry knowledge spillovers, 
while diversity goes together with more extensive inter-industry knowledge exchange.  
Subsequently, the competition factor affects the degree of inter-firm innovation flows. 
There already exists an extensive literature about the importance of knowledge 
spillovers as a factor determining the optimal R&D strategies of firms.  The very basis was 
laid by the study of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)), which has shown that the 
spillover effect influences the firms’ willingness to cooperate in R&D.  Their main 
conclusion states that, when knowledge spillovers are relatively strong, symmetric 
economic agents have strong incentives to cooperate with each other.  
Gandal and Scotchmer (1991) advocate that it is more efficient to delegate research 
efforts to the agent with the highest ability by means of a Research Joint Venture (RJV) and 
this will lead to better private and social results.  In the framework of A&J (1988), the study 
of Lukach and Plasmans (2000) investigated the optimal R&D and production strategies on 
firms, which have different capabilities in research and production.  It concludes that in 
RJVs the firm with a lower marginal per unit cost of R&D conducts the overwhelmingly 
larger part of joint R&D.  This finding provides the additional evidence of delegation 
described by Gandal and Scotchmer.  Moreover, under conditions of stronger knowledge 
spillovers, the creation of an RJV leads to a better social welfare position. 
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In his famous ‘Learning by Doing’ model, Arrow (1962) points out that the 
competitive behavior of firms in the economy yields a smaller amount of aggregate 
investment compared to the socially desirable one.  By stimulating firms to cooperate in 
R&D, the social planner shifts the mode of their R&D and production behavior from a 
competitive to a less competitive position with a higher value of the welfare function.  In 
order to stimulate R&D cooperation among innovative firms, the regulator has a number 
of tools to achieve the desired effect.  Such tools can be direct and tax subsidies, 
government’s R&D investment and expenditures policies.  
For example, in the described theoretical framework, the profit maximizing firms in 
industries with weak knowledge spillovers tend to compete in R&D, rather than to 
cooperate.  Thus, if the regulator wants to induce R&D cooperation, it should come up 
with some tangible way to stimulate these firms’ cooperation.  On the other hand, in 
conditions with strong knowledge spillovers market forces provide a certain stimulus for 
companies to cooperate in research and thus the regulator can save resources by letting ‘the 
nature doing its job’.  Thus, if we consider the regulator’s task in stimulating the economic 
growth by inducing R&D cooperation, it becomes clear that the correct assessment of the 
knowledge spillovers’ environment can be one of the important elements for the success of 
such regulating policy. 
 
1.2. Knowledge Spillovers: the Patent “Trail” 
Our research relies heavily on the observation that the decision to patent a certain 
innovation is a ‘strategic decision’ (Jaffe et al. (1993)).  If the firm decides to apply for a 
patent, it recognizes the potential value of the invention.  Of course, this does not mean 
that not patented knowledge is worthless, but we should advocate that the patented 
knowledge is the one most likely to be commercialized.  There have been a number of 
historical developments that created more incentives for firms to protect their innovation 
by means of a patent.  First, the main purpose of a patent is to protect an ‘individual’ act of 
invention and to grant the inventor temporary rights to exclusively benefit from his/her 
innovative idea. But as the volume of ‘invention by investment’ (Kingston, 2001) increased 
over time, patents had to evolve to accommodate also the rights of the investor, who 
employed the inventor and/or provided him/her with means of research. Gradually, 
patents became protectors not only of the individual act of creativity, but also of the result 
of directed and managed investment in research and development.   
Previously intended as a mere legal document, the patent turned into a tool of strategic 
competitive behavior.  Firms build their intellectual property portfolios, trade patents, sell 
licenses, and create patent pools with other firms.  In some industries patents have a crucial 
strategic importance.  In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, it is not enough to 
patent only one molecular structure for the efficient protection of the invention.  A small 
molecular variation of the same active component must also be patented.  Thus, firms in 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries have to apply for numerous patents to protect their 
innovative effort and investment.  Firms in other industries are also getting more active in 
patenting. 
Plasmans et al. (1999) advocate that the entrepreneurial innovative behavior can be 
explained reasonably well by the entrepreneur’s patenting behavior.  They use the average 
propensity to patent (the number of patents per million constant PPP dollars of R&D 
expenditures) as a crude measure for the absence of knowledge spillovers and apply it to 
panel data for core EU countries and different industries (over the sample period 1989-
1995).  
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In their contribution to the publication of The National Innovation System of 
Belgium, Capron and Cincera (2000) studied the technological performance of Belgian 
companies using patent and scientific-publication information as output indicators of 
technological and innovation activity from 1980 to 1996.  This study aimed to determine 
the areas of comparative technological advantage and the regional distribution of 
innovative efforts in Belgium. 
As we conclude that patents encapsulate an important part of the commercially 
valuable knowledge, it is rational to consider the advantages of utilizing patent data in the 
analysis of firms’ strategic R&D behavior.  It was said above that, technically, a patent is a 
legal document. Its content consists of the information verified and submitted afterwards 
to a controlling body.  Thus, the patent citation is a certified evidence of previous 
knowledge used by the inventor(s), who obtain(s) a given patent.  This previous knowledge, 
eventually, comes from the same patented domain. Hence, we conclude that the patent 
citation shows the spillover of one protected (i.e. recognized as potentially valuable) 
knowledge pool to another. 
The study of patent citations has its own limitations.  Advantages and disadvantages of 
using patent citation data are extensively discussed by Griliches (1990) and Jaffe et al. 
(1993).  Patent citations are linked to the patenting procedure itself.  They capture only the 
knowledge flows, which occur between patented ‘pieces’ of innovation, thus 
underestimating the actual extent of knowledge spillovers.  Other means of knowledge 
transfer are not captured by patent citations.  These means are: purchase of capital goods 
with embodied technologies, employment of engineers and other creative staff from other 
firms and institutions, voluntary knowledge exchange at conferences and in scientific 
publications, etc (see also Dumont and Tsakanikas (2001)).  Though we should admit the 
importance of other non-patent-citation ways of knowledge exchange, it is necessary to 
point out that only the patent citation is to a large extent finalized as a representation of 
such exchange.  The knowledge acquired informally or indirectly is likely to become an 
object of a dispute with other economic agents.  Such disputes are common in business 
practice and they add a substantial amount of disturbance in data, when it is used for the 
analysis of innovative information exchange.  Patent information is better protected from 
such disruption, because it clearly indicates the ownership over a particular piece of 
knowledge, which is protected by law.  Patent disputes are also possible, but these are 
usually resolved quickly by the authoritative institutions1. 
There is one more shortcoming in patent citation data.  The patent examiner has the 
right to add other citations he/she finds applicable in the given case, even though the 
inventor may not be aware of the inventions added.  Addition of new citations by the 
patent examiners is widely practiced in the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark 
Office), and the EPO (European Patent Office) examiners are able to do that as well.  We 
have interviewed one of the USPTO examiners and she informed us that for the majority 
of US patents (as they are published in the published databases) it is not possible to 
effectively distinguish between the ‘original’ citation and a citation added by the examiner.  
Actually, we can consider those added records as an indication of knowledge spillovers, 
which are not officially recognized by the inventors, but from which he or she could have 
benefited as well.  But all the other advantages, including a vast pool of data available, and, 
                                                          
1 David and Hall (2000) point at the possibility of  ‘patent races’, imitation activity, excess correlation between 
research projects of different enterprises, which can be considered as a waste of R&D resources. In that case 
it is advisable to study these phenomena and to determine the actual degree of R&D waste in certain 
industries. 
 5
most of all, explicitness of patent claims make the patent citation a good object for 
knowledge transfer analysis (Jaffe et al. (1993) and Verspagen (1997)). 
An extensive study of Verspagen (1997) analyses patent citation data in relation to the 
productivity growth analysis for a cross-country, cross-sectional sample.  He advocates that 
patent citations provide a measure for knowledge spillovers, which is different from other 
conventional measures.  In addition, in 1999, Verspagen investigated the impact of large 
Dutch companies on domestic knowledge diffusion in the Netherlands by studying patent-
to-patent citation data, provided by the EPO.  This study employed a network analysis to 
analyze the place of Dutch multinationals in the domestic technology infrastructure. 
Another Dutch study investigated the citations to Dutch-authored research papers on 
granted USPTO patents (Tijssen (2001)) to figure out the impact of the Dutch-authored 
innovations on other patented knowledge. 
Our study derives itself from the previous investigation of knowledge spillovers in 
Belgium (see Plasmans and Lukach (2001)).  This study presented a ‘snap-shot’ picture of 
knowledge flows through the mechanism of patent citations in all the Belgian firms’ patent 
applications to the EPO, and the granted applications submitted to the USPTO in 1997.  
In this paper we conducted a comparative analysis of the data and tested the methodology 
for qualitative response variable analysis  (probit, logit and Weibull modeling), which was 
based on the recent research of Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) who constructed a probit-type 
binary choice model of knowledge flows using patent citations.  They have built a 
likelihood measure for the citation probability for any given patent pair.  This allows a 
numerical evaluation of the ‘citation frequency’2 between different industries as well as 
between different geographical areas.  The study of Jaffe & Trajtenberg was based only on 
data provided by the USPTO and concentrated on the industrial and national levels.  We 
apply a similar technique to estimate the impact of knowledge spillovers (domestic and 
international) among different industries in Belgium, but we employ two sources, the 
USPTO and the EPO databases, thus widening our data’s scope by building two 
compatible datasets.   
In the current study we managed to achieve several important improvements and 
extensions for such analysis. First, we managed to obtain two compatible datasets from the 
EPO and the USPTO.  Our fundamental data units are represented by all patents granted 
to Belgian firms by the EPO and the USPTO during the period between 1996 and 2000 
inclusive.  We consider not only the citations between the patents issued by the same 
office, but also the citations, in which one patent was issued by the EPO and another by 
the USPTO (cross-patent-office citation)3.  We determine all the Belgian firms which have 
patents granted during the observed period and aggregate them in industries.  Together 
with the industrial structure of spillovers, we are also able to build a geographic pattern of 
the Belgian patent citations. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
In this paper we analyze patenting data from two major sources: the EPO and the 
USPTO.  The main purpose of this research is to create a picture of the ‘patent-driven’ 
                                                          
2 According to the definition given by Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998), a ‘citation frequency’ is a likelihood 
measure for the probability that any particular patent h granted in year t will cite some particular patent k 
granted in year tτ ≤ . 
3 To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of substantial differences in European and US patent 
offices regulations, which could prevent us from using cross-patent office citations and from pooling 
these two samples. 
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knowledge spillovers in Belgium.  In particular, we study the set of the patents obtained by 
Belgian firms during the five years from 1996 to 2000. 
We are interested in a firm-level analysis of the data.  Thus, we intend to adjust the list 
of considered firms using the shareholding and subsidiary relationship information 
collected by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) and provided by the Bureau van Dijk 
(BVD’s BelFirst database).  The dataset, currently available to us, describes the firms’ 
corporate governance structure as presented in their 1998 annual reports.  Since 1998 is a 
median year in the observed period, we assume that it provides a good approximation for 
the typical firms’ corporate governance structure for the period 1996 - 2000. 
The raw dataset is presented by the patent citations indicated in the patents granted to 
Belgian corporate applicants by the EPO or the USPTO.  Among those, we select all 
citations, corresponding to the applicants, which are identifiable in the BelFirst database.  
This allows us to adjust the ownership of patents belonging to the firms, which are 
involved in shareholder-subsidiary relationships.  Thus, the primary object of our analysis is 
the patenting behavior of the Belgian firms. 
Our primary source of information lies in ‘patent citation pairs’.  This kind of data 
supplies a good opportunity to study knowledge flows, indicated by the citation references 
in the patent application.  For example, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) and Verspagen (1999) 
conducted analyses of different patent citation datasets using different methodologies: 
econometric probit(logit)-type models, technological proximity matrices, and network 
analysis.   
 The dataset, which we use, provides data on all the applications that resulted in 
granted patents and already contains the citations indicated by the patent office 
investigators.  We have obtained additional advantage by using the data from two different 
patent offices simultaneously.  In the large majority of previous studies only one source was 
used and only one particular part of citations was studied. If the data were derived from the 
EPO database, then the sole citations studied were (mainly) the citations where one EPO 
patent cites another EPO patent (similarly with USPTO).  In our case we use not only 
citations between patents issued by one patent office, but also the citations when the patent 
issued by the EPO cites the patent issued by the USPTO and vice versa.  This is a very 
important new development, which significantly expands the sample and improves its 
representativeness. 
In our primary dataset each line represents a single patent citation accompanied by 
several descriptive characteristics, which are: the patent number, the applicant’s name, the 
applicant’s country, the year in which the patent was granted, and the patent’s class 
according to the International Patent Classification (IPC).  In addition to that, we use the 
IPC-ISIC (ISIC – the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities of the United Nations) concordance table compiled by Verspagen et al. (1994) to 
transform somewhat ambiguous IPC classes into more business-oriented groups indicated 
in the ISIC (compatible with the familiar NACE classification). 
The patent citation pool is used to build another interesting dataset.  We aggregate the 
citation data and summarize them in a firm-oriented sample, where the basic observation is 
the firm, which is ‘identifiable’ and can be linked to the NBB’s information.  Thus, there 
exists a number of variables, attributed to each firm: the total number of citations from 
patents applied for (both with the EPO and the USPTO), the number of citations from 
patents applied for with the EPO, the number of citations from patents applied for with 
the USPTO, the total number of citing patents applied for (both with the EPO and the 
USPTO), the number of citing patents applied for with the EPO, the number of citing 
patents applied for with the USPTO.  
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3. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
After an initial processing of the data, we are able to make certain preliminary 
observations and conclusions.  In this way we plan to build up some basis for the further 
model analysis.  These results come from a basic aggregation of the data on the number of 
patents and citations, corresponding to different firms, industries, and countries.  The 
source dataset is a pooled sample of all patents granted by the EPO and the USPTO to 
Belgian firms during the period between 1996 and 2000.  It contains 2738 patents (1135 
from the EPO and 1603 from the USPTO), which produce 11840 initial patent-to-patent 
citations (2513 originating from the EPO patents, and 9327 from the USPTO). Our 
conclusions and observations are grouped in several sections: 
• geographic distribution of citations; 
• firm-oriented distribution of patents and citations; 
• the structure of the ‘citation time lag’ between citing and cited patents; 
• the distribution of citations among different industries. 
Geographic distribution of citations.  First, we consider the basic geographic 
distribution of citations made by Belgian applicants.  Table 1 lists the ten countries, from 
which most cited patents originate.  The list of ‘top ten performers’ consists of countries with 
more than 1% of total citations and covers the vast majority of these citations (96.2%).  
According to the data from both patent offices, the USA patents are the ones cited the 
most.  The second and third places are held by Japan and Belgium, although in the USPTO 
sample Belgium is the third, but in the EPO sample it is second.  Rationally, we would have 
expected that Belgian patents will be the mostly cited (i.e. in the first place), driven by the 
argument that intra-firm and intra-country citations are more likely to occur (Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg (1998), pp. 6-7) than the more distant ones.  Patents from the United States are 
the most frequently cited by Belgian companies, which allows us to assume the existence of 
a very strong ‘transatlantic’ knowledge flow.  The ‘Japanese’ knowledge spillover channel is 
also quite strong.  The other positions are occupied by the countries of the European 
Union (EU) and the Czech Republic, which is now holding the candidate status.  Thus, we 
conclude that the ‘geographic proximity’ assumption is not strongly supported by the 
collected information: domestic patents are not the most frequently cited; although citing 
domestically cannot be rejected at the first site, because we observe the Belgian patents in 
the top three group.  We can explain this finding by the fact that Belgium is a very small 
open economy relative to US and Japan. 
In Table 1 we also observe that the citations of American patents account for more or 
less comparable parts in the USPTO and the EPO samples.  So, if we assume that the 
citations added by the examiners at USPTO do have a certain bias towards adding more 
citations to the American patents, this disturbance is not strong. 
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Table 1. Geographic distribution of patent citations of Belgian firms’ 1996-
2000 patents granted by the EPO and USPTO. 
 Country USPTO EPO Total 
1 United States of America  42.15% 35.98% 40.62% 
2 Japan  18.64% 17.11% 18.26% 
3 Belgium  17.18% 20.42% 17.98% 
4 Germany   6.07% 7.36% 6.39% 
5 France 3.17% 4.15% 3.41% 
6 Great Britain  3.19% 3.88% 3.36% 
7 Italy  1.63% 2.15% 1.76% 
8 Czech Republic 1.93% 0.85% 1.65% 
9 Switzerland 1.55% 1.60% 1.56% 
10 The Netherlands  0.90% 1.95% 1.16% 
 Other 3.59% 4.55% 3.84% 
 
 
Table 2.  Percentage of patents granted to selected Belgian firms by the EPO 
and the USPTO and in total during the period 1996-2000. 
  USPTO EPO Total 
1 Agfa-Gevaert 38.86% 34.71% 37.14% 
2 Solvay 9.30% 10.93% 9.97% 
3 Janssen Pharmaceutica 7.86% 3.17% 5.92% 
4 Esselte 2.62% 2.64% 2.63% 
5 Raychem 2.74% 2.82% 2.78% 
6 Dow Corning 1.87% 1.06% 1.53% 
7 Xeikon 1.75% 1.06% 1.46% 
8 Fina Research 2.43% 3.00% 2.67% 
9 Glaverbel 1.62% 0.26% 1.06% 
10 Heraeus Electro-Nite International 2.06% 1.85% 1.97% 
11 Bekaert 2.18% 2.03% 2.12% 
12 Plant Genetic Systems 2.74% 0.35% 1.75% 
13 Innogenetics 1.75% 0.79% 1.35% 
14 Smithkline Beecham Biologicals 0.94% 0.97% 0.95% 
15 U.C.B. 1.00% 1.32% 1.13% 
16 Michel Van De Wiele 1.62% 0.97% 1.35% 
17 Picanol 1.06% 1.67% 1.31% 
18 Owens – Corning 0.50% 0.09% 0.33% 
19 Bayer Antwerpen 0.56% 0.88% 0.69% 
20 Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products 0.87% 0.00% 0.51% 
 Other 15.66% 29.43% 21.37% 
 9
 
Table 3.  Percentage of patent citations generated in the patents granted to 
selected Belgian firms by the EPO and the USPTO and in total in 1996-2000. 
  USPTO EPO Total 
1 Agfa-Gevaert 34.19% 36.01% 34.58% 
2 Solvay 9.37% 9.99% 9.50% 
3 Janssen Pharmaceutica 5.46% 3.66% 5.08% 
4 Esselte 4.71% 3.50% 4.45% 
5 Raychem 4.17% 3.26% 3.98% 
6 Dow Corning 3.20% 1.35% 2.80% 
7 Xeikon 2.89% 1.51% 2.60% 
8 Fina Research 2.04% 3.10% 2.26% 
9 Glaverbel 2.52% 0.24% 2.04% 
10 Heraeus Electro-Nite International 2.10% 1.79% 2.04% 
11 Bekaert 2.14% 1.59% 2.03% 
12 Plant Genetic Systems 2.29% 0.36% 1.88% 
13 Innogenetics 1.66% 1.11% 1.55% 
14 Smithkline Beecham Biologicals 1.27% 1.19% 1.25% 
15 U.C.B. 1.23% 1.11% 1.21% 
16 Michel Van De Wiele 1.30% 0.76% 1.18% 
17 Picanol 0.89% 1.35% 0.99% 
18 Owens – Corning 1.21% 0.04% 0.96% 
19 Bayer Antwerpen 1.00% 0.72% 0.94% 
20 Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products 1.14% 0.00% 0.90% 
 Other 15.22% 27.34% 17.80% 
 
 
Firm-oriented distribution of patents and citations.  The second block of 
preliminary results deals with the ‘top 20 performers’ among the investigated firms.  Table 
2 contains percentages of patents granted to these companies.  Table 3 presents the list of 
firms with the highest number of patent citations indicated in patents granted by the EPO 
and the USPTO during the period from 1996 to 2000.  In this table we see that the top 20 
companies (or 9.6% of all firms in our dataset) account for more than four fifths of the 
patent citations.   
These results are closely related to the findings already presented by Plasmans et al. 
(1999), which are based on the study of the patenting behavior in 22 major industrial sectors 
of EU core countries during the period 1989 – 1995.  This study indicates that a very limited 
number of companies actually accounts for the significantly larger part of patents granted by 
the EPO.  In our data we observe a similar picture: the three companies at the top of the list 
own 56.02% of all patents issued between 1996 and 2000 (inclusive) by the USPTO and the 
48.81% of patents issued by the EPO during the same period.  Results of Capron and 
Cincera ((2000), p. 178) indicate that there was a tendency of growing concentration of 
patenting among the limited number of bigger players.  Our findings show that during the 
recent half decade such concentration got even stronger.  For example, Capron and Cincera 
((2000), p.179) indicate that during the period 1980-1996 the top 20 Belgian patenting firms 
covered 49.8% of the EPO patents and 65.7 of the USPTO ones.  But since 1996 we see that 
the top 20 players are responsible for 70.57% and 84.34% of patents respectively.  Therefore, 
there is strong evidence of progressing concentration of patenting efforts in Belgium. 
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Table 4 shows the ‘aggregated size’ characteristics of companies mentioned above.  
We have obtained weighted consolidated turnover figures for each firm as the sum of the 
firms’ own turnover and the turnovers of their subsidiaries weighted by the total 
participation share.  A similar procedure was applied to the average annual employment as 
well.  These variables serve as proxy measures for the firms’ relative size characteristic.  
Among these companies, some are quite big and known (Agfa-Gevaert, Solvay, 
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Glaverbel, Bekaert), but also some are much smaller companies 
(Esselte, Xeikon, Sofitech, Owens - Corning).  This indicates that, although the biggest 
firms occupy the top three positions, there are also small companies engaging in the active 
patenting process.  Thus, the large size of a company does not necessarily indicate that it 
will be more active in patenting than its smaller companions. 
 
 
Table 4.  Profiles of selected Belgian firms (based on 1998 annual financial 











1 Agfa-Gevaert 66.1 5701.62 
2 Solvay 82.9 3629.04 
3 Janssen Pharmaceutica 48.2 3864.98 
4 Esselte 5.4 571.98 
5 Raychem 11.8 849.07 
6 Dow Corning 2.0 394.00 
7 Xeikon 4.8 274.00 
8 Fina Research 2.6 474.00 
9 Glaverbel 36.1 4278.78 
10 Heraeus Electro-Nite International 3.1 471.00 
11 Bekaert 33.61 4965.00 
12 Plant Genetic Systems 1.1 167.00 
13 Innogenetics 0.7 379.80 
14 Smithkline Beecham Biologicals 26.4 1442.00 
15 U.C.B. 36.5 3692.74 
16 Michel Van De Wiele 6.9 583.89 
17 Picanol 13.8 1764.98 
18 Owens - Corning 16.0 906.00 
19 Bayer Antwerpen 39.1 2575.00 
20 Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products 4.3 297.61 
 
 
The structure of the ‘citation time lag’ between citing and cited patents. Based 
on the data about the time lag between citing and cited patents we can derive the 
implications about the time structure of knowledge spillovers.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
                                                          
4 We obtained weighted consolidated turnover figures for each firm as the sum of the firms’ own turnover 
and the turnovers of their Belgian subsidiaries weighted by the total participation share.  A similar 
procedure was applied to the average annual employment as well.  These variables serve as proxy 
measures for the firms’ relative size characteristic. 
 11
distribution of cited patents among the different years.  The basic shape of the distribution 
is very much alike to the shape of the estimated citation frequency functions obtained by 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998).  The figure shows that recent patents (relative to the date of 
the citing patent) are more likely to be cited than older ones.  The specifics of the patent 
examination process actually allows for the (small) negative citation lag values to occur as 
one patent can cite a published application for another patent, which is granted later than 
the citing patent itself, or when the cited patent is reissued. 
We should point out another fact worth noting. The time structure of the citation lag is 
pretty much the same in both the USPTO and the EPO samples.  This can serve as 
additional evidence of compatibility of the data in these two samples and that pooling of 
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Figure 1. Time Lag Structure based on the Belgian patents granted by two 
different patent offices during 1996-2000.   
 
Intra-industry citations in different industries.  Let us consider the industrial 
structure of patent citations indicated in a pooled sample (the USPTO and EPO samples 
together).  Figure 2 presents the ‘surface’ of intra- and inter-industry citations.  Each point 
on the surface represents the percentage of the citations between two industry codes in the 
overall sample. The industries presented in the figure were determined from the patent’s 
main IPC, transformed using the IPC-ISIC concordance table (Verspagen et al. (1994)).  In 
determining the category of a patent, which indicates several categories in application, we 
used the first category listed.  Table 5 lists all the industries indicated in the ISIC, 


































































































 Figure 2. Relative Frequencies of 1996-2000 Citations Among Industries Surface 
(for industry codes see Table 5).  
 
Actually, the figure is a graphical representation of the cross-industry citation matrix, 
calculated over the whole citation sample.  This matrix closely resembles the widely used 
‘Yale matrix’ (see e.g. Verspagen (1997)).  As we expected, these diagonal elements are 
quite ‘high’ (see the ‘Main Diagonal Ridge’ on Figure 2), i.e. there is evidence that intra-
industry citations are more numerous than the citations between different industries.   
The highest peaks correspond to intra-industry citations in ‘Chemistry excluding 
Pharmacy’ (10.9% of all citations), ‘Instruments’ (10.1%), ‘Pharmacy’ (6.28%), and ‘Other 
Machinery’ (5.17%) industries.  There is also a number of peaks outside the main diagonal, 
which point at active streams of knowledge flow between certain industries. These flows 
are primarily symmetric (relatively strong in both directions between two industries), but 
there are several asymmetric peaks corresponding to one-directional spillovers, such as 
between ‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’ and ‘Instruments’ (1.34%).  Among the symmetric 
cross-industry knowledge flows, the strongest ones occur between ‘Chemistry excluding 
Pharmacy’ and ‘Pharmacy’ industries (5.6% of citations one way and 5.25% in the opposite 
direction), between ‘Chemistry exd. Pharmacy’ and ‘Other Machinery’ (1.48% one way and 
1.51% in the opposite direction). 
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Table 5.  Citation Percentages in Different Industries (as a fraction of all 
citations 1996-2000). 
ISIC code Industry % of citations 
3510+3520 Chemistry, except pharmacy 21.29% 
3850 Instruments 14.04% 
3522 Pharmacy 13.41% 
3820 Other machinery 11.55% 
3400 Paper, printing and publishing 6.94% 
3810 Metal products, exd. machines 6.38% 
3825 Computers & office machines 5.38% 
3900 Other industrial products 5.22% 
3100 Food, beverages, tobacco 2.56% 
3832 Electronics 2.50% 
3600 Stone, clay and glass products 2.23% 
3200 Textiles, clothes, etc. 2.22% 
3830 Electric mach., exd. electronics 1.79% 
5000 Building and construction 1.23% 
3710 Ferrous basic metals 0.70% 
3720 Non ferrous basic metals 0.58% 
1000 Agriculture 0.56% 
3843 Motor vehicles 0.45% 
3300 Wood and furniture 0.33% 
3530+3540 Oil refining 0.22% 
4000 Utilities 0.19% 
3550+3560 Rubber and plastic products 0.15% 
3840 Other transport 0.09% 
3841 Shipbuilding 0.01% 
 
There are eight major industries which account for the largest part (84%) of all 
citations considered: 3510+3520 (Chemistry excluding Pharmacy), 3850 (Instruments), 
3522 (Pharmacy), 3820 (Other Machinery), 3400 (Paper, Printing and Publishing), 3810 
(Metal Products, excluding Machinery), 3825 (Computers and Office Machines), and 3900 
(Other Industrial Products). Individual shares of these industrial sectors are presented in 
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Figure 3. Percentages of 1996-2000 Citations by Industries 
 
4. MODELS AND ESTIMATION 
 
4.1. Citation Pairs Modeling 
Now we intend to employ an econometric methodology to try to get a deeper insight 
into the knowledge spillovers pattern, ‘encoded’ into patent citation data.  Previous 
researchers’ experience (Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998)) shows that patent citation data are 
best to be analyzed using a binary choice qualitative response model.  The occurrence of a 
citation with particular attributes represents a binary event (occurrence or not), of which it 
is possible to estimate the probability of occurrence. 
We focus our attention to one particular kind of events, which takes place as the patent 
citation occurs.  The event is ‘the citation occurs in the citing patent belonging to the 
particular industry class’.  We study the estimated probability of this event and its 
relationship with a set of independent variables in order to derive analytical implications 
about the inter- and intra-industry/firm structure of knowledge spillovers.  Our dependent 
variable is an indicator, which has value 1 if the citation occurs in the patent of a given 
particular industry, and equals 0 otherwise.  We have chosen patents from the eight major 
industries (mentioned above and representing 84% of all citations during the period 1996-
2000) to be analyzed by the model.  We consider the following list of explanatory variables: 
• an indicator that the patent citation has occurred between patents, owned by the same 
firm or institution (equals 1 if both citing and cited patents belong to the same firm, 
and equals 0 otherwise), it is represented by the dummy variable SameFirm; 
• a ‘concordance weighted’ indicator that the citation has occurred between patents, 
belonging to the same ISIC-industry class (real number between 0 and 1 inclusive);  it is 
represented by the variable SameIndustry; 
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• the year when the citing patent was issued represented by the variable Year; 
• the value of a citation lag (i.e. the time difference between citing and cited patents, 
expressed in years); it is represented by the variable CitationLag. 
We use the concordance percentage from the MERIT Concordance Table (the share 
of the patents in each IPC-class assigned to the corresponding ISIC category, see 
Verspagen et al. (1994)) to weigh the indicator variable for the citation occurred.  For 
example, if two patents belong to the same industry, we calculate the product of their 
concordance percentages, obtaining in this way the measure of the ‘citation occurrence’ in 
this particular industry.  The concordance percentage is the relative frequency of patents in 
the particular IPC class falling into a given ISIC class, thus their product in the citation pair 
represents a certain likelihood measure of the patent citation itself to fall into this ISIC 
class.  Moreover, the usage of concordance percentages leads to the expansion of the 
modeled sample due to the fact that one IPC-class may fall into several industries with 
different weights. 
It is possible to estimate several different specifications of the binary choice model: 
probit, logit or an extreme value distribution, such as a Weibull distribution (see Appendix 
and also Greene (2000), Chapter 19).  In a preliminary estimation we compared probit, 
logit and Weibull specifications of the model. The goodness of fit criteria showed that the 
Weibull model predicted the probability of patent citations in our sample (in the majority 
of industries) best of all three5. The distribution of our dependent variable is most likely 
asymmetric, because the number of citations occurring in a certain industry (corresponding 
to non-zero elements in the sample) is certainly expected to be much smaller than the 
number of citations in other industries together (zero elements). Of course, the 
distributions of various independent variables are asymmetric too.  As we return to the 
frequency graph (Figure 1) for the time lag variable, we see that it is quite asymmetric with 
more weight falling on the more recently granted cited patents. In our binary variables 
(such as the event indicator and variable SameFirm) too, we see that zero values are more 
numerous than non-zero ones. This is also true for the non-binary variable SameIndustry. 
We have run another series of preliminary computations to determine the best way in 
obtaining the general implications about the knowledge spillovers.  In this step we 
conducted the estimation of a Weibull model in two different sub-samples: the sample 
consisting of citations indicated in EPO data, and the sample consisting of citations 
indicated in USPTO data.  We came to the conclusion that it is reasonable to use the 
pooled sample to study the knowledge spillovers generated by the patent citation behavior 
of Belgian companies. There are three arguments in support of this decision.  Firstly, after 
estimation of the model in two different samples we observed that 25 out of 32 (8 industry 
equations with 4 slopes each) estimated slope coefficients6 have the same sign with mostly 
sufficient statistical significance.  Secondly, because the object of our interest is the overall 
picture of patent citation induced knowledge spillovers generated by the Belgian 
companies, it is preferable to consider these patent citations in a pooled sample.  And 
thirdly, the close similarity in the time lag structure, firms’ patent and citation percentages, 
provides additional arguments for the compatibility of these two datasets. 
Estimation results.  There are several notes to be made about the interpretation of 
the results.  Among the explanatory variables in our model we have one binary variable, 
two integer variables, and one coming from the real numbers set.  The corresponding 
                                                          
5 The goodness of fit score is best in 5 out of 8 industries for Weibull: ‘Chemistry excl. Pharmacy’, 
‘Instruments’, ‘Pharmacy’, ‘Other Machinery’, ‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’. 
6 In this model the slope coefficient is the product of the corresponding equation coefficient and the value of 
the distribution density function calculated at the means of the regressors (see Appendix). 
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slopes or marginal effects (see Appendix) are presented in the output tables (Tables 6 – 
13).  In these tables we marked the variables, which yielded different signs in the separate 
USPTO and EPO samples with a star superscript. Below we are going to refer to some 
results of the estimations conducted in different samples.  Because of lack of space, only 
results from the pooled sample Weibull estimation are presented in tables. 
 
 
Table 6.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Chemistry, excluding Pharmacy’ 
industry. 
3510+3520 Coefficient Slope Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept -33.4727 11.60921 8.3133 0.0039 
SameFirm -0.1747 -0.05717 0.02176 64.4765 <.0001 
SameIndustry 0.41329 0.135242 0.01794 530.7173 <.0001 
Year 0.01693 0.005539 0.005811 8.4871 0.0036 
TimeLag* -0.00195 -0.00064 0.001507 1.682 0.1947 
 
Chemistry, excluding Pharmacy (Table 6).  The results in the ‘Chemistry excl. 
Pharmacy’ industry indicate that there is evidence of a negative relationship between the 
SameFirm dummy and the probability of the citation.  This fact was also indicated in both 
the individual USPTO and EPO samples.  It allows us to conclude that a ‘chemical’ patent 
is more likely to cite a patent belonging to a different firm, rather than its own, i.e. this 
industry is more oriented towards the usage of the other firms’ patented knowledge.   
The coefficient for the SameIndustry variable points at a higher likelihood of a citation 
to occur in the same industrial class. This is quite reasonable because of the special nature 
of the chemical industry.  Chemical patents usually protect either molecular structures or 
technological sequences for their synthesis; thus this knowledge does not go far beyond the 
scope of the own industry. 
The positive coefficient for the variable Year indicates that the citation is more likely to 
occur in the relatively newer chemical patents.  Concerning the time difference between the 
citing and cited patents, it is difficult to make a definitive conclusion about the relationship 
between the time lag and the likelihood of a citation due to the (completely) insufficient 
statistical significance of the estimator.  Moreover, different sub-samples yielded different 
conclusions for this coefficient (positive in the EPO and negative in the USPTO). 
To summarize the results, we may state that in the ‘Chemistry, excluding Pharmacy’ 
industry the ‘citation-induced’ knowledge spillovers tend to be inter-firm, but intra-
industry.  The question about how the ‘age’ of a cited patent affects the probability of 
citation in this industry requires additional inquiry.  As for citing patents, there is a clear 
indication that the newer patents tend to generate more citations. 
 
 
Table 7.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Instruments’ industry. 
3850 Coefficient Slope Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept 49.01282 12.46039 15.4723 <.0001 
SameFirm 0.05167 0.013128 0.02386 4.6888 0.0304 
SameIndustry -0.92024 -0.2338 0.01864 2436.454 <.0001 
Year* -0.02402 -0.0061 0.006236 14.8376 0.0001 






Instruments (Table 7).  Our data for this industry provides evidence of the positive 
relationship between the likelihood of patent citation and the fact that the citing and cited 
patents both belong to the same firm. There is a very strong evidence that in the 
‘Instruments’ industry the probability of the citation is much lower when citing and cited 
patents belong to the same industry class. 
There are mixed signals coming from two samples concerning the estimated slope 
coefficient for the Year and TimeLag variables, but the pooled sample delivers these 
coefficients with a quite high statistical significance.  It corresponds to the sign, obtained 
from the largest (USPTO) sample, which dominates the smaller (EPO) one. It shows that 
the more recent citing patents indicate a smaller number of citations, and that the older 
patents are more likely to be cited by the patents in this industry. 
The final ‘verdict’ for the Instruments industry states that it strongly favors inter-
industry knowledge spillovers, and leans towards intra-firm patent citation.  Knowledge in 
this industry does not seem to ‘depreciate’ fast, which fact is supported by the evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between the time lag between the patents and the 
probability of citation. 
 
Table 8.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Pharmacy’ industry. 
3522 Coefficient Slope Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept 21.69069 11.76131 3.4012 0.0651 
SameFirm -0.24386 -0.06506 0.02128 131.3063 <.0001 
SameIndustry* 0.21525 0.057429 0.0203 112.4091 <.0001 
Year* -0.01054 -0.00281 0.005887 3.2048 0.0734 
TimeLag 0.005544 0.001479 0.001588 12.1814 0.0005 
 
 
Pharmacy (Table 8).  The ‘Pharmacy’ industry shows a lower likelihood of the intra-
firm citation and a higher probability for knowledge spillovers in the same industry (but we 
get different signs in the sub-samples).  Thus, in general we expect a knowledge exchange 
that is more intensive among different firms, but in the limits of the same industry.  
It appears that the more recent pharmaceutical patents indicate fewer citations, 
although the coefficient is moderately significant and varies in sign in the two sub-samples.  
The coefficient for the TimeLag variable is positive and significant, and it points at a slower 
knowledge ‘depreciation’ in this industry. 
 
 
Table 9.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Other Machinery’ industry. 
3820 Coefficient Slope Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept -49.9749 11.91326 17.5972 <.0001 
SameFirm 0.14916 0.036699 0.02311 41.6769 <.0001 
SameIndustry 0.09567 0.023538 0.01898 25.4147 <.0001 
Year* 0.02545 0.006261 0.005963 18.2167 <.0001 




Other Machinery (Table 9).  The title for this industry is quite ambiguous and makes 
it difficult to extract particular policy implications, although there is a significant number of 
patent citations covered by it.  The results show that in this industry the time difference 
between two patents negatively affects the probability of the citation, and that newer 
patents employ a larger number of external citations.  Regarding the existence of intra-firm 
spillovers, we find strong support for this in the pooled data and in both individual sub-
samples as well.  It also provides strong evidence for a more intra-industry knowledge 
exchange.  
 
Table 10.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’ 
industry. 
3400 Coefficient Slope Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept 49.1891 12.57772 15.2945 <.0001 
SameFirm -0.16522 -0.02977 0.02291 51.9971 <.0001 
SameIndustry 0.22454 0.040453 0.02094 114.9527 <.0001 
Year -0.02419 -0.00436 0.006296 14.7621 0.0001 
TimeLag 0.01228 0.002212 0.001662 54.5651 <.0001 
 
Paper, Printing and Publishing (Table 10).  As the estimations in both sub-samples 
‘agree’ on signs of the coefficients, and as we already provided a number of explanations 
for coefficients above, we will try to keep short.  This industry exhibits a more inter-firm, 
but intra-industry pattern of patent citations.  Newer patents cite less and the older patents 
are more likely to be cited. 
 
 
Table 11.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Metal Products, excluding 
Machines’ industry. 
3810 Coefficient Slope  Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept 2.91598 13.13631 0.0493 0.8243 
SameFirm 0.23553 0.03895 0.02751 73.2795 <.0001 
SameIndustry 0.27673 0.045762 0.02169 162.8431 <.0001 
Year* -0.00093 -0.00015 0.006575 0.0198 0.888 
TimeLag -0.01997 -0.0033 0.001693 139.1178 <.0001 
 
 
Metal Products, excluding Machines (Table 11).  The industry is more ‘turned 
towards itself’.  The probability of the patent citation’s occurrence is higher when two 
patents belong to the same firm and come from the same industry.  Thus, the external 
knowledge spillovers in the Metal Products industry are weak and some R&D cooperation 
inducing measures may be advisable. 
There is strong evidence for a negative relationship between the time lag and the 
likelihood of the citation: recent patents are cited more, indicating a faster knowledge 
depreciation in this industry.  The effect of the patent’s issue year on citation is left 





Table 12.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Computers and Office Machines’ 
industry. 
3825 Coefficient Slope Std. Err. Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept 96.65918 14.03608 47.4236 <.0001 
SameFirm 0.23978 0.034592 0.02833 71.6273 <.0001 
SameIndustry -0.33882 -0.04888 0.02011 283.9024 <.0001 
Year -0.04786 -0.0069 0.007025 46.4103 <.0001 
TimeLag 0.02061 0.002973 0.001944 112.3771 <.0001 
 
Computers and Office Machines (Table 12).  This industry deserves special 
attention due to its importance in the current technology driven times.  The model was able 
to produce statistically very significant coefficients with full concordance of the two sub-
samples.  The data strongly advocate for more intra-firm knowledge usage rather than 
inter-firm.  Concerning the inter-industry knowledge spillovers, there is a strong support 
for it, meaning a higher likelihood that the knowledge from other industries will be used. 
The model provides strong support for the positive dependence of the probability of 
citation on the time difference between patents, thus indicating the relatively higher rate of 
older knowledge utilization.  We also see that newer patents are less likely to cite the 
knowledge from other patent documents. 
 
Table 13.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Other Industrial Products’ industry. 




Intercept -102.44 13.32543 59.0987 <.0001 
SameFirm 0.02239 0.003269 0.02513 0.7935 0.373 
SameIndustry 0.31166 0.045508 0.02264 189.575 <.0001 
Year 0.05173 0.007553 0.00667 60.1418 <.0001 
TimeLag 0.01037 0.001515 0.001792 33.5008 <.0001 
 
Other Industrial Products (Table 13).  The coefficient for the SameFirm dummy is 
not significant at all for a conclusion.  The indication for mainly intra-industry patent citing 
behavior is very strong.  The more recent citing patents cite more, and older patents have 
higher chances to be cited. 
 
4.2.  The Intra-Firm/Intra-Industry Positioning Of Industries 
To obtain a better view on general results of modeling the knowledge spillovers, we 
present a map of relative positions for particular industries with relation to the likelihood of 
intra-firm and intra-industry citation.  Figure 4 is a two-dimensional graph, where on the 
horizontal axis we plot the slope coefficient for the SameFirm dummy and on the vertical 
axis is the slope coefficient for the SameIndustry variable.  Such an arrangement is based on 
the interpretation of the obtained slope coefficients.  A slope coefficient in our model 
describes the change in the probability of a patent citation at the means of the regressors 
(Greene (2000), p. 879). 
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Figure 4. Positioning of Industries with Relation to Intra-firm and Intra-industry 
Knowledge Spillovers (based on the Weibull model). 
 
Thus, a pair of such coefficients for a particular industry points at its unique position 
on the map relative to other industries and the origin, which can be interpreted in the 
following manner.  The bottom-left quadrant of the map contains industries, which are 
more inclined towards inter-firm and inter-industry knowledge spillovers (the probability of 
citation decreases for patents belonging to the same firm and industry class).  We can call 
such industries ‘open’.  On the opposite, the top-right quadrant of the map contains more 
‘closed’ industries, which favor intra-firm and intra-industry citation (the citation is more 
likely if the patent pair comes from the same industry and is owned by the same owner).  
The bottom-right quadrant combines a higher likelihood of inter-industry, but intra-firm 
spillovers, which, for example, can be the case in complex technologies (see Kingston 
(2001)). And the top-left quadrant combines intra-industry and inter-firm spillovers 
correspondingly. 
On Figure 4 we see that there are no truly ‘open’ industrial sectors considered in our 
pooled sample.  A group of ‘closed’ industries consists of ‘Metal Products, exd. Machines’, 
‘Other Machinery’, and ‘Other Industrial Products’ classes.  The ‘Metal Products, exd. 
Machines’ industry is the most ‘internally-oriented’ among them all.  The ‘Instruments’ 
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industry is in an interesting position, where it is almost indifferent towards the intra- or 
inter-firm citation, but it is strongly on the side of inter-industry knowledge utilization.  
The ‘Computers and Office Machines’ industry is open for inter-industry knowledge 
spillovers, and is less inclined towards using the knowledge of other firms.  The ‘Chemistry, 
excluding Pharmacy’ and the ‘Pharmacy’ industry itself, exhibit greater openness for inter-
firm knowledge spillovers, which preferably do not go far beyond the scope of the same 
industry.  A similar behavior can be observed in the case of ‘Paper, Printing and 
Publishing’. 
As we think about the political implications of such analysis, it is recommended to turn 
to the main conclusions of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Lukach and Plasmans 
(2000).  They state that under conditions of stronger knowledge spillovers, symmetric and 
asymmetric innovative firms have more incentives to engage in R&D cooperation, which 
results in a larger R&D investment and innovative product output.  For a regulator whose 
goal is to induce R&D cooperation, it is important to balance the market incentives, 
created by stronger knowledge spillovers, and the regulative incentives. 
The general guidelines for the regulator, derived from our study, can be summarized by 
observing the relative positioning map along the horizontal axis.  The industries in the right 
quadrants appear to be more oriented towards intra-firm knowledge spillovers, thus there 
are rationales for stimulating the R&D cooperation among the firms in these industries.  
On the other hand, the industries, situated in the left quadrants, operate under conditions 
of stronger knowledge spillovers, and there are market incentives, which drive the 
companies towards more cooperation.  The regulator in this case can stand on less 
intrusive positions, observing the ‘natural’ tendencies towards cooperation and maybe 
stimulating only the most interesting joint R&D projects and/or alliances. 
 
4.3. Agfa-Gevaert: An Outlier Problem 
Looking back at the data in Table 3, it does not take much attention to notice that one 
firm towers far high above the others.  Patent citations coming from the patents owned by 
Agfa-Gevaert account for 34.58% of the pooled sample.  The runner-up Solvay has a 
considerably lower share (9.5%) of citations.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Agfa-
Gevaert generates a strong outlier effect in our data.  As an experiment we delete all the 
citations coming from the Agfa-Gevaert’s patents from our sample, re-estimate the model 
and built another intra-firm/intra-industry positioning map on the basis of the new results.  
This new map is presented on Figure 5.  If we compare the newly obtained map with the 
previous one, we can make the following observations: 
- only one industry (‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’) out of eight changed its quadrant 
as a result of the outlier’s deletion. The ‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’ industry ‘took 
off’ from the moderately inter-firm and intra-industry inclined position and ‘landed’ in 
the point with relatively strong inclination towards intra-firm and intra-industry 
knowledge spillovers; 
- ‘Chemistry excl. Pharmacy’ and ‘Pharmacy’ industries slightly moved in the limits of 
the same quadrant in the direction of more inter-firm knowledge spillovers; 
- ‘Metal Products excl. Machines’, ‘Other Industrial Products’ and ‘Other Machinery’ 
industries moved to the neighboring positions (although closer to the origin) in the 
same intra-industry intra-firm quadrant; 
- ‘Computers & Office Machines’  moved slightly to the position with weaker intra-firm 
and a bit stronger inter-industry spillovers; 
- the ‘Instruments’ industry now is more in favor of intra-firm and less, but still evident, 
of inter-industry knowledge utilization. 
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Figure 5. Positioning of Industries with Relation to Intra-firm and Intra-industry 
Knowledge Spillovers (excl. Agfa-Gevaert and based on the Weibull model) 
 
Thus, comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5 it becomes visible that deletion of the Agfa-
Gevaert’s citations from the sample lead to certain changes in the estimation results, 
although not extremely dramatic.  The majority of industries shifted around, but stayed in 
the same quadrant as before.  From the size of the industry’s shift we can judge the 
influence the outlier had in the sample. The jump of the ‘Paper, Printing & Publishing’ 
industry from one quadrant to another illustrates the especially active position of Agfa-
Gevaert in this industry.  Without Agfa-Gevaert this industry seems to be more closed, 
while in the full sample it looks more open. We also conclude that Agfa-Gevaert has a 
critical mass in the ‘Instruments’ industry, as we observe its quite a long jump from the 
very strong to moderate inter-industry spillovers’ position, but into the relatively strong 
intra-firm position. Other industries did not exhibit such strong qualitative change which is 
understandable.  The conducted experiment showed that Agfa-Gevaert indeed creates a 
quite noticeable disturbance as an outlier in the observed sample, but only in the industries 
of its own specialization. 
 23
We realize with a certain degree of surprise that ‘Chemistry excl. Pharmacy’ industry 
did not exhibit a considerable shift, although chemistry is traditionally considered the main 
area of Agfa-Gevaert’s specialization.  On our opinion, this fact has to do with a time 
frame of the analyzed data.  Our data spans only over last 5 years during which Agfa-
Gevaert was in the process of major shift of its production specialization from the 
traditional photographic products to the area of digital visual equipment, x-ray devices, and 
computer periphery.  Thus, it becomes understandable why positioning of the chemicals 
industry did not change much after Agfa-Gevaert was excluded from consideration. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to investigate the patenting and patent citation 
behavior of the Belgian private firms using the 1996-2000 patent citation data from the 
EPO and the USPTO.  The attention of this study was concentrated on the patent citation 
behavior of Belgian firms using the Weibull binary response variable model (preferred after 
comparing it with probit and logit specifications).  We have conducted an extensive 
preliminary analysis of the data and built empirical models.  The results can be summarized 
in the following statements: 
1. First, the study of the patent citation data proved to be useful in the analysis of 
innovation behavior of Belgian firms.  A preliminary analysis has indicated that the 
majority of the patenting is conducted by a (very) small number of firms being different 
in size (represented by the consolidated weighted turnover and consolidated weighted 
average annual employment). 
2. The estimated probability of a patent citation, calculated given a particular set of factors 
(SameFirm dummy and SameIndustry variable, time lag between the citing and the cited 
patents, the year in which the citing patent was issued), can be used as an efficient 
measure of the size of knowledge spillovers in a certain industry, and can be applied for 
various competitive behavioral models.  Once the special feature of the industry is 
determined (such as the likelihood of inter- or intra-firm spillovers and the likelihood 
of inter-industry knowledge exchange), we obtain an understanding of the knowledge 
spillovers intensity.  Additionally, the relationship between the likelihood of citation 
and the size of a time lag between the citing and cited patents indicates the speed on 
‘citable’ knowledge depreciation. 
3. In particular, analyzing the relative positioning of different industries depending on 
their attitude towards inter-firm knowledge spillovers allows us to infer implications 
concerning the necessity of measures to stimulate R&D cooperation.  For example, it is 
preferred that the regulator proposes more R&D cooperation stimulating policy 
towards the industries with less intensive knowledge spillovers, and employs less 
regulation in the industries where such spillovers are stronger and create more natural 
incentives for firms to cooperate in R&D.   
4. The occurrences of patent citations in Belgian patents in eight major industries were 
studied. As a result of this study, it is possible to determine the ‘level of openness’ of 
different industries toward inter-industry and inter-firm knowledge exchanges through 
patent citation. Industries with more complex technologies (such as ‘Computers & 
Office Machines’ and ‘Instruments) are more open towards inter-industry knowledge 
flows.  On the other hand the industries with ‘uniform’ technological orientation (such 
as ‘Chemistry’, ‘Pharmacy’, ‘Metal Products’, and ‘Paper, Printing & Publishing’) stay 
more oriented at intra-industry knowledge utilization. In ‘Chemistry’, ‘Pharmacy’ we 
conclude higher intensity of inter-firm knowledge exchange, which would indicate a 
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better environment for R&D cooperation.  Firms in the other industries favor more 
internal knowledge flows and have fewer incentives to cooperate in R&D. 
5. We conclude that Agfa-Gevaert introduces substantial outlier’s disturbances in the 
pooled sample.  Deletion of this firm’s patents from the dataset leads to a noticeable 
change in the positions of the industries, where Agfa-Gevaert exhibits stronger 
specialization: ‘Paper, Printing & Publishing’, and ‘Instruments’ industries.  Such 
disturbances were much weaker in other industries, although, in the case of Chemistry 
excl. Pharmacy (AGFA is considered to be a chemical firm) industry such a conclusion 
is a bit surprising. 
Summarising these findings, we up with an argument that public authorities should use 
differentiated measures to regulate R&D activities (and especially R&D cooperation) by 
firms in different industries.  The existing knowledge spillovers create certain market-
driven incentives inducing firms to cooperate. It is possible for a regulator to use these 
incentives in combination with particular regulatory measures to achieve the desired effects, 
whether it is higher R&D investment or improved diffusion of knowledge in the economy.   
For the firms operating in the industries with conditions of stronger knowledge 
spillovers, the regulator can adopt a less intrusive policy (which is usually a ‘cheaper’ one as 
well), observing the ‘natural’ tendencies towards cooperation and possibly stimulating only 
the most interesting joint R&D projects and/or alliances.  More regulators’ attention must 
be paid to the firms in the industries with weaker knowledge spillovers, because these firms 
tend to invest in R&D in a more competitive way.  It will require a bigger effort from the 
regulator to stimulate R&D cooperation by direct subsidies and/or advantageous tax 
measures in such cases.  The major outcome of such a successful policy will eventually 




The Weibull Binary Choice Model for Patent Citations 
The pooled dataset contains a list of citation pairs, which have already occurred.  Thus, 
if we consider the probability of a citation to occur in patent pairs from our dataset, it is 
equal to 1. Within this population, we select several other sub-events, for example ‘the 
citation has occurred in the citing patent coming from industry A’.  The basic Weibull 
model can be specified: 
' 'P( 1) ( ) 1 exp( exp( ))i i iy F x xβ β= = = − − , 1,2,..,i n= , where n is the number of 
observations. In our case we have: 
1 2 3 4' i i i i i ix Const SameFirm SameIndustry Year CitationLagβ β β β β ε= + + + + + . 
The dependent variable Yi is an indicator that the patent citation occurred in the 
particular industry (see above).  It is also known that the estimated coefficients of a Weibull 
model (probit and logit as well) do not yield the value of the marginal effect of the 
independent variable.  For the Weibull model, the marginal effect for an independent 
variable is calculated as the product of the corresponding equation coefficient and the value 
of the density function calculated at the means of regressors:   
'
'












, 1,2,..,i n= , 1,2,.,j k= ,  
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where ' ' 'ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) exp( exp( ))i i if x x xβ β β= −  is the Weibull density function calculated at the 
mean of the estimated structural part of the model7.  
Since we have one binary variable in the model, another method for calculating the 
marginal effects should be mentioned.  For a binary independent variable b, the marginal 
effect (also called slope) is calculated as  * *{ 1 | , 1} { 1 | , 0}P Y x b P Y x b= = − = = .  However, 
Greene ((2000), p. 817) indicates that ‘simply taking the derivative with respect to the 
binary variable as if it were continuous provides an approximation that is often surprisingly 
accurate’.  Thus, we calculate the slopes for the binary independent variables in our model 
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